The role of licenses in public utility services provision : 19th century experiences by Adamczyk, Elżbieta
The subject of this article is a part of a broader debate related to the participation of the private sec-
tor in the execution of public services. It concerns those services which are provided to recipients in 
the conditions of a natural monopoly, based on a license (so with the privilege of exclusivity) award-
ed to private companies for executing the state’s tasks. This paper aims at outlining the reasons be-
hind the implementation of similar solutions and the problems related to entrusting the private par-
ty with satisfying public needs – problems which revealed a conflict of interest between the parties 
of the licensing contract.
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Municipalization of the econoMic life
the problem of “municipalization of life” has been observed since the 
mid-19th century, manifesting in the fact that public associations take over 
more and more aspects of life which had previously been a part of the 
private sphere. in the beginning, communes were mainly entrusted with 
managing their own property, maintaining communal roads and supervis-
ing local police. local police tasks included: ensuring the security of peo-
ple and property, policing in the field and in markets, supervising foods, 
measures, weights, manufacturers, workers, and morality, acting as con-
struction and fire police.1 the scope of communal activities, and in partic-
ular the scope of its legally regulated tasks, was not precise and left some 
1 examples of tasks were included in the austrian communal act from 1862. Grzy-
bowski Konstanty, Historia państwa i prawa Polski. Od uwłaszczenia do odrodzenia państwa 
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freedom in applying the law. usually, everything that “directly concerned 
the interest of the commune and lay within its borders, that can be done 
and solved by the commune itself” was included in the own tasks of the 
commune.2 legal acts included examples of cases for which the commune 
was responsible, but the list was open-ended, complemented as needs – 
and the possibilities of satisfying them – grew.
intensive industrialization and urbanization in the 19th century 
changed the image of towns. it also meant that everyday needs of citizens 
kept growing. 19th-century technological advances gradually enabled 
these to be satisfied in a collective way. The organizers of these services 
were communes, which, with safety in towns in mind, introduced modern 
technological solutions to improve public lighting and sanitary conditions, 
hiring specialized private companies for executing those tasks. Municipal 
services were not commonly available at first and networks usually cov-
ered only the town center and adjacent streets; they were also expensive, 
and therefore, unavailable for many inhabitants, but with time they be-
came more common. at the time, communes took responsibility for mak-
ing the services available to the population. one has to bear in mind that 
those services satisfy the needs we refer to as “elementary”, “common”, 
“daily” – shared by all inhabitants of a given territory. Satisfying them en-
hances the welfare and culture of the whole commune.3 one of the many 
authors who emphasized the importance of communes in satisfying the 
needs of the inhabitants was Konstanty Krzeczkowski:
the activity of a commune aims at satisfying all the elementary needs of inhabitants, 
that is, the most important individual and collective needs of people in a given terri-
tory. the more life is concentrated in some territories, the more there are local needs, 
and the more tasks that can be performed and regulated only by means of collective, 
communal effort. in scholarly discourse, this pursuit, happening constantly and ever 
so rightly, is referred to as the municipalization of life – that is, transferring a growing 
number of individual activities to the area of interest of a commune.4
the recurrent nature of those needs and their expansive character is in-
separably connected with business activity. business activity of public as-
[the history of poland and polish law. from enfranchisement to the rebirth of the State], 
Volume IV, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1982, p. 309.
2 ibidem, p. 309.
3 Krzeczkowski Konstanty, Gmina jako podmiot polityki komunalnej [commune as a sub-
ject of municipal policy], Samorząd Terytorialny, no. 3/1938, p. 17.
4 ibidem, p. 18.
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sociations is located in the sphere referred to as the “public utility sphere”. 
The notion of “public utility” has no single, “clear” definition, and its scope 
is (more or less precisely) defined by laws of individual states. For exam-
ple, henryk hendrikson indicated that:
The notion of public utility is difficult to define precisely, particularly since it chang-
es over time and space. in the united States, where much has been written on the sub-
ject, it is defined by providing a list of the main economic commodities which the pub-
lic opinion consistently considers to be of a general interest. [...] Since the 19th century 
one can notice a steady growth of industries that can be included in the definition of 
public utilities. this was related to numerous inventions and a general improvement 
in the living conditions of societies. the expansion of public utility services became 
one of the most important manifestations of the Wagnerian rule of expanding func-
tions of the state and other public bodies.5
the range of public utility services depends on time, place, and other 
factors.6 the catalog of tasks changed due to economic and political doc-
trines dominant in a given time, but primarily as a result of the practical 
challenges of economic life. legislation in individual states has in a way 
been constantly redefining this notion, demonstrating the methods of per-
forming tasks that comprise the public utility sphere.
Monopoly in the public utility Sector
in economics, especially in various model descriptions of the economic 
reality, dichotomous divisions of goods are used, and one of such dichoto-
mies is the division into private and public goods. private goods are those 
delivered (in market-regulated economies) by the market. To be more pre-
cise, those are goods which are competitive in terms of consumption and 
exclusive in terms of possession and enjoyment of the good (pure private 
goods). taking these criteria into consideration, one can adopt an a contra-
rio definition of a public good as a good for which there is no competition 
in terms of consumption and exclusion from consumption is impossible or 
5 hendrikson henryk K., Przedsiębiorstwa użyteczności publicznej [public utility compa-
nies], Samorząd Terytorialny, no. 4/1938, p. 9.
6 for example, the scope of issues considered a part of the public interest is typically 
much broader during wars or crises than in times of peace and economic prosperity – the 
problem of food supplies can be an example.
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difficult (pure public goods). In contrast to private goods, no market test is 
able to assess the right amount of public goods, because:
in a purely competitive market, public goods will not be delivered at all simply be-
cause no one will agree to pay the taxes to finance them – the absolute benefits from 
things like public defense, elimination of fumes and noise, cleaning areas which are 
prone to infectious diseases etc. are awarded to everyone, regardless of who pays for 
them and who does not. everyone has some reason to evade contribution.7
the majority of goods which are often referred to as public has, how-
ever, only one of those determinants. it concerns primarily those goods 
which are characterized by the lack of competition in consumption, but 
the “non-exclusivity” element is not present. there is a whole number of 
goods whose consumption can be limited by pricing. excludability is not 
a matter of logic, but of costs (exclusion). Such goods include e.g. goods 
which satisfy individual needs in a collective manner, are supplied via 
networks and are priced, so they can be provided via the market. those 
goods are now considered public utility goods, and the enterprises provid-
ing them are referred to as public utility companies. those include main-
ly services such as: water distribution, water treatment; electricity, heating 
and gas supply; and local public transport.
the majority of those services can only be delivered effectively when 
there is just one producer (and supplier) of a given good on a given market. 
in this case, a natural monopoly exists, whose attribute is the economy of 
scale. obtaining the economies of scale is possible where the average long-
term costs decrease. this means that the bigger the volume of production, 
and therefore the bigger the number of recipients, the greater the profits. 
establishing a network company is related to high costs of entry which in-
clude e.g. costs of building central equipment and the network. therefore, 
from the economic point of view, competition in this market is not desir-
able, and one producer is capable of providing the good at a lower price 
than would be the case with several competing companies. the basic dif-
ference between a competitive market structure and a monopolized mar-
ket is that in the competitive model, the price is determined by the market 
(the producer accepts the price), while in the monopoly model the produc-
er determines the price. in the competitive model, the company optimiz-
es the production to the level at which marginal cost becomes equal with 
7 blaug Mark, Economic Theory in Retrospect, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 
2000, p. 615.
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the price. When selling an additional unit of production, the producer ob-
tains the same price, so marginal revenue equals the price (in a short peri-
od of time). in the case of monopoly, similarly, the volume of production 
is set at the level equalizing marginal cost with marginal revenue, but it is 
the monopoly that sets the price, so it will be set above the marginal cost. 
the difference between the price and marginal revenue is evidence of the 
power of monopoly; one can say that the monopoly receives what is due 
(as in the competitive market) plus whatever its power allows it to obtain. 
from the economic point of view, this situation is described as ineffective. 
one can, then, talk about the so-called social cost of monopoly, manifest-
ed in a relatively low supply of the product at a cost higher than would be 
the case in a competitive setting. increasing the sale at a given price can 
encounter the demand barrier (decreasing curve of monopoly demand), 
which means the need to lower the price for the whole production being 
sold. Subsequent losses are compensated by the monopoly by setting dif-
ferent prices of the same product for various groups of recipients (price 
discrimination). recipients are divided into those for whom demand is 
flexible, offered the product at a lower price, and those for whom the de-
mand is not as flexible, who pay more.8
before arthur pigou’s paper Economics of Welfare (1920) was published, 
giving the intellectual foundation for interference of public associations in 
the economic life, monopoly had been treated as one of the reasons of mar-
ket mechanism dysfunction. this interference was manifested in the ten-
dency to municipalize public utility companies, and in attempts to control 
or regulate them, from the beginning of their functioning, based on the ex-
clusivity privilege.
the right of public associations to control a private company execut-
ing public works primarily results from the right to land transferred for 
use to the private party, especially when it concerns services provided via 
networks (e.g. street lighting, supplying gas to individual recipients etc.). 
providers of these services, using the exclusivity privilege, are not forced 
8 Within the New Institutional Economics, price discrimination is seen as a part of the 
theory of transaction costs and the concept of contract, and more precisely, related to atyp-
ical contracting. a hypothesis is posed that price discrimination is only a means reveal-
ing the internal power of monopoly, while the original power of monopoly is not subject 
to change. interpretation of this non-standard contracting in relation to product tying was 
developed by Aaron Director and Edward Levi (1956); and in relation to package order-
ing by George Stigler (1963). Williamson Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1998, p. 38.
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to compete over access rights to land, squares and streets, like in the case 
of other licenses. the privilege of using public land and roads is linked 
with the need to comply with certain conditions. those applying for those 
rights have to show that they are able to use them, that is, they are in the 
required financial condition and they have adequate knowledge on pro-
duction engineering and management. Sometimes, the public party tries 
to control the profit level, setting an upper price limit. It also tries to attract 
many bidders, although due to high risk, one can hardly expect that more 
than one company will apply. a dilemma might occur in the case of grant-
ing the right to build the network to more than one company, like it hap-
pened in many towns in Great britain in the early decades of the 19th cen-
tury. cities like birmingham, york and edinburgh had more than one gas 
provider. the streets of london were also lined with gas pipes belonging 
to different companies. admitting more than one company to the market 
was most likely aimed at boosting competition without losing the benefits 
related to having a small number of providers.9 With time, it turned out 
that the existence of two or more competing gas plants in town created 
many problems and was not a desirable solution, both from the economic 
and the social point of view. competing entities needed larger capital than 
just one plant, and interest and amortization of the bigger capital led to in-
creasing prices for consumers. in the end, public parties withdrew from 
admitting free competition in these markets. for example, in london, the 
13 gas plants operating in the city in 1860 were allotted separate districts.10 
each plant was a monopolist in their own district, enjoying the exclusivi-
ty privilege. in france, the construction of a coordinated system of roads 
was planned, whose scheme (from 1850) assumed the existence of six re-
gional networks. 21 independent associations were to be involved in their 
creation. the issue of licenses was subjected to public opinion. as a re-
sult, when designing the network, competition “in” the field was not ap-
proved, while competition “for” the field was.11
9 Millward robert, Private and Public Enterprise in Europe. Energy, Telecommunications 
and Transport 1830-1990, Cambridge University Press, New York 205, p. 25-28.
10 Sprawozdanie Komisji Rady Miejskiej w Krakowie w sprawie gazowej [a report of the 
city council committee in Kraków on the gas problem], national archive in Kraków, sign. 
3054, p. 10.
11 Millward robert, Private and Public Enterprise..., p. 29.
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licenSinG – an early Model 
of iMpleMentinG public taSKS
licensing for public task execution has an old history, as the regula-
tory state function belongs to the scope of historically-shaped function of 
all types of power. a state regulates economic activity using its power, 
ownership rights, and state monopoly in some aspects of economic life.12 
licensing means privileging some participants of economic life by mak-
ing them able to function in a sphere reserved for the state. it has some fea-
tures of an ordinary permission, but differs in being granted for a limit-
ed economic activity, for different reasons, and for particular aims, which 
also justifies the special mode of issuing a license.13 While not giving up its 
monopoly, the state organizes the performance of some of its tasks, equip-
ping the selected subject in some attributes of administrative power and 
some privileges.14
network enterprises, emerging and developing dynamically, as the 
needs and possibilities resultant from the technological advances of the 
19th century grew, were sometimes run directly by communes and owned 
by them. More often, however, private companies were hired based on a li-
cense. in most towns, the latter solution was also adopted earlier, chrono-
logically. Private companies – natural monopolies – benefited from a real 
monopoly (as discussed earlier) and from a legal monopoly.
cezary Kosikowski outlines two types of licenses which were histori-
cally formed – the french and austro-German licenses. the type born in 
france is considered the classic type of license.
in this respect, the license meant withdrawal from the national monopoly in favor 
of the private subjects, in order to entrust them with administrative tasks of the state 
which were of an economic nature. along with the license, certain rights of the state in 
the sphere covered by the license were transferred (e.g. the right to expropriation, the 
right to maintain administrative police, the right to charge users, the right to conduct 
administrative enforcement procedures). the license also stipulated rules for its im-
plementation. the following were considered fundamental features of a license: 1) it is 
a contract of a purely administrative character, 2) its aim is the performance of a pub-
lic service, 3) the performance occurs at the risk of license-owner, 4) remuneration of 
12 Kosikowski cezary, Wolność gospodarcza w prawie polskim [economic freedom in the 
Polish Law], Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Warszawa 1995, p. 114.
13 Kosikowski cezary, Koncesje w prawie polskim [licensing in the polish law], instytut 
Prawa Spółek i Inwestycji Zagranicznych, Kraków 1996, p. 19.
14 ibidem.
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the license holder is provided by awarding them the right to charge users based on 
a tariff, 5) it is a long-term contract. In the literature, this type of license is more often 
considered an administrative contract or an act comprising an administrative decision 
and a contract.15
the license type shaped based on austrian and German scholarship 
had only one thing in common with the french license: it was a permis-
sion to undertake the economic activity in the sphere that was subject to 
state monopoly. However, these were qualified permissions of a police 
nature, issued in the form of an administrative decision. the license hold-
er did not receive any rights in terms of administration, was subject to all 
laws, and had to pay for the license.16
in the 19th century, the practice of economic life gave rise to a whole 
variety of variously constructed license contracts. the crucial element was 
the license act which stipulated the conditions upon which the execution 
of license rights was dependent. according to the law, a number of licens-
es also required (along with a municipal authorization) a national author-
ization. This concerned mainly transport and electrification enterprises.17 
license contracts gave the license holder the right of exclusivity in terms 
of production and provision of a given good and the right to charge us-
ers of this good. furthermore, they granted special rights in terms of us-
ing public property, so the right to use roads, streets, and squares, along 
with the right to permanent construction (e.g. pipes, tracks), and, in some 
cases, also the right to use private property, including the right to expro-
priation.18 companies sometimes withdrew from this last right when ne-
gotiating the conditions of the contract in return for some other addition-
al privileges. along with numerous rights, license holders also received 
numerous responsibilities, which were to balance out the rights. this bal-
ance lies in the best interest both of the local community and of the com-
munal association, which, when drafting the license acts, should keep in 
mind the profits from the license and the right quality of services ren-
15 Kosikowski cezary, Polskie publiczne prawo gospodarcze [polish public economic 
Law], Wydawnictwa Prawnicze PWN, Warszawa 1999, p. 211.
16 ibidem, p. 212-213.
17 Biegeleisen Leon W., Teoria i polityka przedsiębiorstw publicznych samorządu terytorial-
nego i państwa [theory and policy of public enterprises of the local Government and the 
State], Sekcja Wydawnicza Bratniej Pomocy Wolnej Wszechnicy Polskiej, Warszawa 1931, 
p. 248.
18 this type of license is a thing of a past.
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dered.19 According to Leon W. Biegeleisen, a license act, especially when 
concerning a public utility enterprise, should have a particularly public-
law character. the company licensed, although run independently, has 
some qualities of a public enterprise, as it enjoys special public-law. he 
claims that the majority of licensing contracts concluded in many Western 
european towns, were of a private-law nature, treating the consumers of 
gas and electricity like regular clients, even though license holders, at the 
same time, enjoyed the monopoly of using streets, and a number of oth-
er benefits resulting from their operation.20 public tasks transferred to pri-
vate companies do not loose their public character; those are the tasks for 
which the state or local government should be legally accountable.21 the 
state only transfers to the private subject its right to directly provide serv-
ices for a limited amount of time, and organizes and supervises the proc-
ess of servicing by the private subject.
communes hired private companies to perform some of their tasks 
primarily because they did not have enough money to perform those cost-
ly activities themselves. they were also afraid of putting the commune 
into debt. funds not spent on debt repayments could be spent elsewhere. 
furthermore, economic activity was not the domain of communes. the 
private companies were the ones that had the right resources in the form 
of capital and specialized knowledge on the latest technological advances, 
production organization and management. they invested those resources 
in gas and electricity, and public transport markets acquired. hiring pri-
vate companies in the construction of municipal facilities made it possible 
to largely solve a number of problems that town authorities were strug-
gling with.
in many licensing contracts, the private party was obliged to design, 
construct and finance the facilities needed to provide services, maintain-
ing their ownership for the whole period of operation. during the opera-
tion, the company bore operational costs and financed day-to-day invest-
ments. It was also entitled to charge users for the supply (e.g. of gas).22 in 
19 Biegeleisen Leon W., Teoria i polityka... [theory and policy...], p. 248.
20 ibidem, p. 292-293.
21 Biernat Stanisław, Prywatyzacja zadań publicznych. Problematyka prawna [privatizing 
Public Tasks. Legal Problems], Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa-Kraków 1994, 
p. 29.
22 This licensing contract was similar in its construction to the DBFO model (Design-
build-finance-operate), one of the models of public-private partnership recommended 
currently by the European Commission. The first contract concluded with a private com-
pany by the magistrate in Kraków, regarding city lighting, was of a similar construction. 
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return for the exclusivity privilege, the private party took on (among oth-
ers) the risk resulting form the specific nature of assets23 and the opera-
tional risk. other risks included political instability and the lack of accept-
ance by the local community (especially in the case of foreign companies). 
as to the public party, it gained an enterprise with the latest equipment, 
professionally organized and managed by experienced managers, with-
out the need to borrow money and bear the risk of inefficient use of pub-
lic means. however, by awarding broad rights to the company, the com-
mune risked possible conflicts resulting from breach of contract terms by 
the private company, and a limitation in (or even a loss of) the possibility 
to supervise and control the process of rendering the service for which it 
remained responsible.
the risk related to starting the production and the operation of the 
company caused private companies to make demanding requirements in 
negotiating process regarding the period of operation and the amount of 
freedom. Contracts were usually concluded for 25-30 years, sometimes 
they were longer. communes often tried to negotiate the shortest possible 
licensing period, which later turned out to be a mistake. the private en-
terprises, with a short time of operation ahead, were reluctant to conduct 
development investments. they were aiming at amortizing the equip-
ment costs as soon as possible, and overexploited the plant. longer op-
erating periods allowed them to obtain the return on the capital invested 
and profits expected.
the history of public utility plants proves that terms and conditions of 
the contracts concluded between town authorities and private companies 
determined the success of the market form of operation and the expansion 
of public services. these terms and conditions did not always satisfy both 
parties, and what is more, they were often not observed. Stipulations of the 
contracts in many sections turned out to be detrimental for towns, which 
led to conflicts between the parties. There were also conflicts in terms of 
interpretation of some provisions included in contracts. in many coun-
tries there were even special counseling offices operating at superviso-
ry authorities and inter-communal associations, which provided informa-
tion and advice, and expressed legal and economic opinions on licensing 
this comparison aims at showing the range of tasks, not a relationship between the parties, 
which can hardly be described as based on partnership.
23 Specific assets include specialized investments, permanently connected with a giv-
en territory – therefore impossible to transfer – which highly increases the investor’s risk.
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contracts.24 The conflicts between the private and public parties were due 
to various accusations related to: the quality of services rendered, high 
prices, lack of development investments, ignoring technological advances, 
hampering quality control, making data concerning the production proc-
ess and financial situation confidential, overexploitation of the company as 
the license expiry date was approaching, estimating the company’s worth 
in the case of buy-out by the public party.25 in many cases, the companies 
agreed to lower prices, but, although this was a step towards improving 
the relationship between the commune authorities and the representatives 
of the company, this did not solve other conflicts, especially since com-
munes were often planning on taking over the plant. in order to force the 
private companies to compromise even more, communes threatened to al-
low competition. This is what happened in the case of conflicts between 
the english license holder, continental Gas association, and the authori-
ties of vienna, who ordered the company to provide lighting in the city in 
1845. The license was first granted for 10 years, and later renewed. The ef-
forts to build their own municipal gas plant (which the English company 
at first ignored) led in the end to the conclusion, in 1875, of a new contract, 
much more beneficial for the commune. The contract was an expression of 
improving relations between the parties: gas prices were decreased, con-
sumers were more protected against increase in prices, and the city was 
to become the owner of all the facilities after 22 years.26 a similar scenar-
io of a “fight” against the gas company was seen in Kraków. A gas plant 
was built in Kraków by the German Gas Association from Dessau in 1857, 
pursuant to the contract regarding lighting the city with gas (for 25 years), 
concluded by the Kraków representatives and the legal representative of 
the Association on April 16, 1856. From the very beginning, the compa-
ny was unpopular among the inhabitants of Kraków. people complained 
about poor street lighting quality and high prices. numerous negotiations 
concerning gas price reduction and attempts to force the company to re-
spect the terms and conditions of the contract bore no results. the contract 
was to expire in 1882, and after this time, 3 solutions were expected: 1/ re-
newing the contract with the German company for the next 15 years, un-
der the same terms and conditions; 2/ buying out the plant, along with 
24 Biegeleisen Leon W., Teoria i polityka... [theory and policy...], p. 249.
25 More on that subject: ibidem, p. 291-294 and other pages; romaniuk Kazimierz, 
Formy organizacyjne przedsiębiorstw komunalnych w Polsce [organizational forms of munici-
pal enterprises in Poland], Kwartalnik Statystyczny, vol. 10, no. 1/1933, p. 33.
26 Biegeleisen Leon W., Teoria i polityka... [Theory and Policy...], p. 266-271.
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the facilities and equipment, by the city; 3/ introduction of free competi-
tion in terms of gas production and supply for city lighting and for pri-
vate use.27 the above solutions were a subject of debate in the gas con-
sumers’ association, organized upon the city council’ magistrate initiative 
in mid-1880. The discussion was chaired by the mayor of the city him-
self, which emphasized the importance of the meeting. city authorities 
aimed at gaining support among gas consumers for the solutions suggest-
ed. the commune, nearly from the beginning of its independent existence 
(from 1866), planned to municipalize gas provisions, therefore the buy-
out of the gas plant was the preferred alternative. however, the price set 
by the association was almost twice as high as the commune was will-
ing to pay. a decision was made to build a separate plant, and thus, to en-
ter into competition with the German gas plant. a massive action of col-
lecting consumer declarations on the consumption of gas from the future 
municipal gas plant was organized. the risk of competition was some-
thing people were aware of, and the German association was under pres-
sure to reduce the price of the plant. however, planning and works relat-
ed to the construction of the municipal gas plant were continued. in the 
end, the authorities resorted to a “drastic” form of pressure, that is boy-
cotting gas usage. Gas lamps were removed from the streets and replaced 
by oil lamps. at that time, gas consumption for public lighting decreased 
by 25%, and private gas recipients followed the steps of city authorities.28 
When the plans of municipal gas plant construction were advanced, the 
association agreed to sell the plant to the city for approximately half of 
the previous price.
in Search of other orGanizational 
and leGal forMS
until the end of the 19th century, communes mostly took over public 
utility enterprises, which was justified by two main motivations: 1/ fis-
cal – increasing budgetary income of the commune, 2/ social – protecting 
the interest of the local community. Studies of Kazimierz romaniuk show 
27 CONTRACT section 21, Kraków 1856, National Archive in Kraków, sign. 3048, 
p. 8-9.
28 Mleczko Grzegorz, 150 lat gazowni krakowskiej [150 years of the Kraków gas plant], 
Karpacka Spółka Gazownictwa Sp. z o.o., Kraków 2006, p. 28.
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that in the Second polish republic, licensing was one of the less common 
organizational and legal forms in the field of municipal activity. According 
to statistical data, in 1928, there were only 43 companies in poland operat-
ing on the basis of a licensing contract, which equaled 1.5% of all munici-
pal plants. This form was mainly used by rural communes (3.7%), and to 
a much lesser extent by urban communes (0.7%) and local government as-
sociations (0.8%). The majority of those plants were slaughterhouses (29) 
and electric plants.29 When looking for the new organizational and legal 
forms of public utility companies, criticism was not spared towards the li-
censing model. Konstanty Krzeczkowski wrote:
the history of municipal entrepreneurship is a great illustration of faith in new legal 
corporate forms. it started with various forms of licenses, each of which promised the 
world, but the benefits promised usually ended with the worst conflicts due to con-
tract violations and disloyal usage of rights. various license types, tried and tested 
on numerous occasions, usually resulted with the same. that is why this oldest form 
of running municipal companies has been completely discredited. however, even if 
nowadays communes sometimes need to resort to them, then even the best formed 
and far-sighted legal contracts cannot save the commune from abuses and dysfunc-
tions of the economy itself. the core of those companies, their aggressive pursuit of 
profit will overcome all legal obstacles.30
there were also more moderate attitudes, which emphasized the need 
to protect private initiative against over-municipalization. reasons be-
hind the pursuit of municipalization were found e.g. in the lack of private 
initiative, in the specific anti-private approach of some local governments, 
and in the unjustified, hostile approach towards private initiative and the 
anti-economic education of the society.31
if the public utility enterprises were sill run by private companies, they 
were regulated. by setting maximum prices, special committees for regu-
lating monopolies could lead to increases in production, making the mar-
ket situation of a given good similar to the competitive conditions. owing 
to that, the consumer obtained more goods at lower prices. in other words, 
the committees deprived monopolies of their power by providing them 
29 romaniuk Kazimierz, Formy organizacyjne… [Organizational Forms...], p. 34-35.
30 Krzeczkowski Konstanty, Zagadnienie przedsiębiorczości komunalnej [the problems of 
municipal entrepreneurship], Samorząd Terytorialny, no. 1 and 2/1933, p. 25.
31 dimitrjew andrzej, Przedsiębiorstwa komunalne w ustawodawstwie polskim [Municipal 
enterprises in the Polish legislation] [in:] Mieczysław Gutkowski [ed.], Prace seminarium ze 
skarbowości i prawa skarbowego oraz statystyki [Works of the seminary on finances, fiscal law 
and statistics], vol. 2, Vilnius 1934, p. 101.
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with the so-called “fair” return on investment. however, there were con-
troversies about the meaning of this term for the company, and about what 
the company’s investments should include in order to provide this “fair” 
return.32 committees also regulated the level of price discrimination. Some 
types of discrimination were forbidden, others could be practiced if they 
were “reasonable”. for example, it was allowed for the company to set 
a lower price for a service threatened by fierce competition. The problem 
of price discrimination raised a number of questions and doubts concern-
ing justice, redistribution of income and economic efficiency.33
 In the final decades of the 20th century the problem of regulation be-
came the subject of criticism, both in the empirical domain, where it was 
argued that benefits were relatively small compared with the cost of reg-
ulation, and in the theoretical field, where the thesis on market regula-
tion in public interest was questioned, emphasizing that the mechanism 
itself is capable of balancing out inefficiencies.34 With the wave of regula-
tion, various concepts were born for solving the problem of prices set on 
monopolist rules and the organization of this type of activity. the return 
of liberal movements, visible both in the doctrine and the practice of the 
economic life, particularly in the 1980s, was a reaction to the Keynesian 
model and the excessive presence of the state in the economic life. the 
expanding interference of the state in economic life, founded on the con-
cept of market mechanism imperfection and the execution of the “social 
interest”, was criticized, and gradually replaced by the theory of political 
mechanism dysfunction (therefore – governmental dysfunction), empha-
sizing the need to execute “the private interest”. focusing on the supply 
part of the economy resulted in efforts to expand the field of operation for 
the private sector. liberalization of the economy was to be achieved by 
various means: the state gradually withdrew from economic life by pri-
vatizing certain spheres, monopolies were deregulated, the direct mode 
of executing public tasks was withdrawn from, and as a result, licens-
es and various permissions became elements of the legal order in many 
european states.
32 Mansfield Edwin, Microeconomics. Theory and Applications, W.W. Norton & Company, 
New York London, 1985, p. 278.
33 Ibidem, p. 279.
34 den hertog Johan, General Theories of Regulation [in:] bouckaert, boudewijn and 
de Geest, Gerrit [ed.] Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. The Regulation of Contracts, vol. 3, 
p. 231, http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5000book.pdf (accessed on October 28, 2015).
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Oliver E. Williamson wrote:
although monopoly-based delivery is usually effective where the economies of scale 
are great compared with the size of the market, it also creates some organizational dif-
ficulties. According to Milton Friedman: There is unfortunately no good solution for tech-
nical monopoly. There is only a choice among three evils: private unregulated monopoly, pri-
vate monopoly regulated by the state, and government operations.35
Some economists (Demestez, Posner, Stigler) said it is possible to avoid 
monopolist prices by using an ex ante contract awarding monopoly fran-
chise to the company which offers the delivery of the product on best con-
ditions.36 What seemed to be the fourth solution did not avoid criticism. 
According to Williamson, the argument in favor of the franchise contract 
can only be maintained only when the competition is effective both in the 
ex ante and ex post stages. He considered the efficiency of franchise con-
tracts highly problematic, especially when the good is to be delivered in 
uncertain conditions and when significant specific assets must be consid-
ered.37
concluSion
for centuries, the best forms of organizing the production of public 
utility goods were sought – forms which would ensure economic efficien-
cy and protect the public interest. Market solutions, either those of the 
19th century or those introduced with the liberal movement of the end 
of the 20th century, did not pass the test. The public model was also the 
subject of criticism. at present, the form which is expected to reconcile 
the public and private interests is the public-private partnership formu-
la, which assumes partnership cooperation of the private and public sec-
tor entities to achieve a common goal, that is performing a given public 
task, without compromising their individual goals. relationships between 
35 Williamson Oliver E., Ekonomiczne instytucje… [The Economic Institutions...], 
p. 329.
36 demestez harold, Why Regulate Utilities, Journal of Law and Economics, no. 11/68; 
Stigler George J., The Organization of Industry, richard d. irwin inc., homewood 1968; 
posner richard a., The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, the 
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, no. 3/1972, following: Williamson 
oliver e., Ekonomiczne instytucje... [The Economic Institutions...], p. 53, 329, 415, 424, 426.
37 Ibidem, p. 53.
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the public subject and the private party, between them and the communi-
ty, and between various groups of interest, play a crucial role in this mod-
el. the foundation of those relationships is loyalty and mutual trust of the 
partners – elements which are cultural, immeasurable and which cannot 
be contained in a contract.
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